This analysis unveils the influence of three social phenomena in the two case studies, namely power, fields of activity and knowledge. Mostly, it focuses on the initiatives led by the European Union and the Organisation of Ibero-American States in order to implement large strategic, multi-government educational plans in each continent. The actions of international political players, the theories (or 'ontologies') embedded in these devices and the consequences for sub-national politics are observed.
account the particular features of the European Union 2020 Strategy and the OEI Ibero-American 2021 Educational Goals so as to explore their commonalities and differences (Tilly, 1984) . This exercise reveals that in both cases governments and international organisations establish alliances, international and sub-national politics become increasingly connected, and the promoters of both initiatives share analogous causal beliefs on the expected results of their educational plans.
The first section of the article defines the lens of analysis, basically focused on the concepts of agency and power, social field and knowledge. The second and third sections portray the EU 2020 Strategy and the OEI 2021 Educational Goals as two significant case studies. Then, the fourth section attempts to shed light on the similar and idiosyncratic processes that take place in Europe and Latin America.
'Education spaces'
Both the EU 2020 Strategy and the OEI 2021 Educational Goals require their member states and associates to operate in international 'education spaces'. Besides a great emphasis on the mobility of higher education students within (and between) these areas (Verger and Hermo, 2010) , these international strategic educational plans also commit school systems to achieve certain statistical targets. Currently, curbing the number of early school leavers and producing one-third of graduates in higher education in each generation are the main European educational goals (European Commission, 2010) , while completing the expansion of primary education, tackling significant drop-out rates in secondary education, and opening access to higher education are the expected outcomes in Latin America (OEI, 2010) . For more descriptive details, see infra.
Besides explicit institutional devices managed by these international organisations, 'education spaces' are also sociological phenomena constituted by agency and power, fields of activity, and the social use of knowledge. Generally speaking, the international organisations, governments, parties, unions, corporations and advocacy networks that intervene in the space of education policy have varying capabilities to influence their counterparts in given contexts of interaction, where everybody does not avail of the same advantages, and some powerful agents use particular forms of expert knowledge to pursue their own interests (Dale, 2009; Lawn et al, 2011) .
Agency and power
Unlike former approaches, many contemporary writers do not look for the roots of human behaviour in structural mechanisms that operate beyond consciousness. Those theories professed that the deep rules of kinship, mythology and social roles, the potential technological responses to natural challenges, and genetic influence determined the actual options for action. Nevertheless, albeit admitting that institutions and social structures contextualise human behaviour, current approaches attribute it to agency carried out through the interplay of individuals and collective actors who pursue their interests, aspire to implement some principles and believe in particular factual ideas about the world (Schmidt, 2008) . A number of contemporary perspectives make this point in sociology -e.g., 'rational action' and 'critical realism', political science -e.g., 'rationalchoice', 'historical', 'sociological' and 'ideational' 'institutionalisms', and international relationse.g. 'constructivism'. Some strands of this scholarship, mostly in sociology, argue that power is a basic component of human agency as well. In their view, certain agents are more powerful than others insomuch as their interests eventually prevail in open conflict. Furthermore, dominant agents may also gain leverage by keeping undesired issues out of the agenda, or by shaping the context in which their opponents have to make their decisions (Lukes, 2005) .
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This emphasis on agency has strongly suggested that national states -the main agent operating in the Westfalian system-, are no longer the single actor in the international politics of education. The key point is that different types of international organisations, corporations, lobbies, think tanks, advocacy networks and social movements disseminate ideas, decide on investment, sponsor policy designs and campaign for social and civil rights (Mundy, 1999 (Mundy, , 2007 . Endowed with uneven power-resources, these players struggle for influence over policy transfer and policy learning between international organisations and national and sub-national levels of government (Dale, 2005) .
Fields
Agency and power normally operate within given fields of social activity where political opportunities open and close. In order to determine their concrete functioning, it is crucial to analyse who writes, enforces and follows the rules of the game (Jenson and Mérand, 2010: 87) .
Likewise, it is plausible to ask whether the interaction between the promoters of regional educational initiatives -who comply with the existing legal commitments, have their own agendas, and respond to the previous historical paths-, eventually produces particular sets of political opportunities for those committed to the EU 2020 Strategy and the OEI 2021 Educational Goal (Dale, 2009: 32) .
Generally speaking, the emergence of policy spaces above, below and through different national societies brings about the symptoms of "regulatory regionalism", a new phenomenon according to some experts in international relations. This is a pattern of regional, supra-national integration which consists of the ordering of boundaries between national and regional levels and the institutionalisation of connections to global governance (Jayasuriya, 2008: 33-4) . Specialists in education policy have observed that "regulatory regionalism" triggers a new politics of bordering 5 and re-bordering that draws limits through complex interplays that often transform the older nested, international and national scales of policy-making into a new web of interlocking scales where agents choose at what level they pursue their strategies (Robertson, 2011) .
Thus, the global no longer contains the national and the sub-national; nor are the agents who operate at these scales determined by factors operating at the higher ones. On the contrary, since political competition, conflict and power relations keep fashioning new scalar articulations in which some agents may choose their position, the growing importance of world regions is likely to derive from consensus and struggles fought within, above and below the European and Latin American 'education spaces'. An example of this complex re-bordering is the specialisation of certain state organisations in enhancing the transcendence of supra-national bids (Sassen, 2006) . Other examples are the simultaneous processes by which a global educational agenda, regional educational spaces and local educational policies are created (Maroy, 2009 ).
Knowledge and temporality
Political players utilise the knowledge about the hypothetical effects of educational plans in order to rank a variety of temporalities. Interestingly, the Lisbon Agenda was to be evaluated in 2010 but then its final judgement was postponed until 2020. The EFA Programme is to be evaluated in 2015, but Latin American governments will also be attentive to a more ambitious deadline for evaluation in 2021. Since knowledge, education policy and temporality are coined in social fields where social agents draw on power the time frames of educational plans must be scrutinized through these specific webs of social relations.
Knowledge is an on-going social activity, embedded in scientific communities which use and transform the pre-existing knowledge about the external world (Bhaskar, 1978: 17, 195) . The 6 sociology of educational policy has widely documented how educational policy-makers provoke and manipulate discrepancy in scientific communities (Ball, 2008; Ozga, Seddon and Popkewitz, 2006) . Policy studies have also discovered that programmes are normally grounded on 'programme ontologies', that is, basic assumptions about the mechanisms they are expected to activate (Pawson, 2006) . Therefore, in the same way that Europeanisation has created an 'education space' where education policy intermingles with a given 'programme ontology' (Dale, 2009: 32) , so Latin American integration is likely to trigger an analogous development. Remarkably, this hypothesis does not imply that the same events will take place, but that analogous social fields are at stake.
A variety of social practices produces the distinct temporalities of child care, employment, politics, finance and national identity (Sassen, 2000; Santos, 2000; Santos, 2005) . Instead of an addition of days and courses measured by hours of teaching and years of schooling, educational time is an intricate order that emerges out of heterogeneous social practices -students' experiences, family aspirations, teachers' professional endeavours, governmental policies, supra-national initiatives and so on. Therefore, educational plans do not necessarily respond to the mid-term of individual educational pathways, nor are the deadlines for programme evaluation a necessary consequence of their logical framework, but conversely, the strategic use of expert knowledge by the parties engaged in the politics of education may eventually pattern evaluation times concerning official goals and targets.
In sum, Europeanisation and Latin American integration impinge on education policies through power and agency, the configuration of fields and the use of knowledge. The involved governments, the EU, the OEI and education policy networks have shaped new and very complex fields of activity. Despite some variation, in both continents the complex implications of regional, international alliances for national and sub-national politics have become apparent. Similarly, an exploration of 'programme ontologies' finds that the EU 2020 Strategy and the OEI 2021
Educational Goals equip their promoters with the same kind of political instruments, and that the promoters of both educational plans use these instruments to set the time for final evaluation.
Europeanisation and education
The European Union was officially created by several international treaties negotiated, signed and passed by national parliaments in the 1990s. Although these treaties did not commit states to align their education systems, in 2001 the European Commission earned a say in this policy area by means of the Open Method of Coordination (Radaelli, 2007) . In the summit held in Lisbon that year, governments were required to coordinate their policies affecting economic growth, sustainability and social cohesion. The latter label included social and education policies in such issues as reducing poverty and early school leaving. Unlike the former procedure through the European Parliament and the executive branches (i.e. the Commission and the Council), the Open Method of Coordination worked by setting common targets and benchmarks so that by 2010 each country was to achieve the goal in its own way. In its website the EU statistical office EUROSTAT publishes the benchmarks and the yearly scores of all the Member States and some comparable countries such as Japan, Norway and the United States.
All the Member States were also supposed to share experiences in international workshops.
The European Commission and the European Council implemented a system of peer learning activities asking Member States and European institutions to meet for systematic reviews of evidence and practices on several issues concerning the Lisbon Agenda. So far, these meetings have enacted different forms of mutual (qualitative), competitive (targets set quantitative incentives for some states to catch up), imperialistic (some countries try to impose their own organisational culture) and surface (defensive, formal responses) modes of policy learning (Lange and Alexiadou, the relationship between education and the economy in a new light (Grek et al, 2009 ).
The OMC filtered down to the agenda of the EU Member States and some of their provincial and local governments. For instance, while England and Sweden faced the need to compare their own tradition of quality assurance with the new EU statistical targets and benchmarks (Grek et al, 2009) , the success of Finland in most PISA tests induced its government to borrow an analogous numerical language from the OCDE (Gornitzka, 2006: 48-51; Grek et al, 2009 ).
Furthermore, a growing group of national and sub-national authorities decided to borrow and implement analogous educational strategic plans. Not only Austria and the Netherlands defined their own national plans (Gornitzka, 2006) , but also Catalonia (Engel, 2008) , Flanders (Simons, 2007) and Scotland (Arnott and Ozga, 2010) issued their own ones in order to strengthen their position vis-a-vis their respective central governments of Spain, Belgium and Britain. Similarly, the set of standard data built by means of the collaboration between the EU and the OCDE has impinged in different ways on central-local relations of educational governance-e.g. while the resulting approach has encouraged re-regulation in England, the outcome has been considerably increased municipal autonomy in Finland (Ozga et al, 2011) . Thus, a variety of governments utilised mid-term objectives in varied ways in order to strengthen their current policies, review their procedures, improve their international image, or emphasise their autonomy. Each political actor considered at which scale of policy-making its action would be more effective.
Spain is a significant example of this complexity. In the early 2000s the conservative central government responded by surface learning (Lange and Alexiadou, 2010) when it delayed the publication of PISA 2000, since the international report challenged its own education reform act, which wanted to re-introduce early tracking [reference deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process]. Moreover, although only a few regions achieved the Lisbon target on early school leaving, in the mid-2000s laggard regions mostly overlooked these general objectives [reference deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process]. This reluctance suggests some evidence of surface policy learning to the extent that official indicators were available but the realisation of disparate scores did not trigger policy changes (Lange and Alexiadou, 2010) . Afterwards, the Catalan government included educational and social targets in its Strategic Agreement on Competitiveness and Social Cohesion in order to tackle a high rate of early school leavers (Gov. Catalonia, 2008 ). The Spanish government followed the same path later on by openly endorsing the OMC in order to deal with the same problem (Gob España-ME, 2010; Gob España, 2011) . These later developments instantiate the competitive learning of governments that want to catch up in terms of the benchmark concerning early school leaving (Lange and Alexiadou, 2010) .
The Open Method of Coordination assumes causal beliefs about the generative mechanisms of the expected impacts (Dale, 2009) . Despite the disappointing results recorded in 2010, the Commission reacted by launching a very similar second programme the targets of which should be achieved by 2020 (Pépin, 2011) . That second ten-year initiative was to trigger virtuous causal circles so that educated talents, democratic values and social and territorial cohesion engendered new synergies. Thus, for the last decade the European Open Method of Coordination (OMC) has shaped an 'education space' where at least the Commission, the Council, the OECD, the governments of Member States and some sub-national governments play a role. In the midst of these intricate politics, a 'programme ontology' relying on hypothetical, virtuous causal circles seems to have legitimised the hegemonic approach by postponing final judgements until 2020.
Latin American integration and education
In contrast with the finance-driven agenda focused on targeting expenditure on primary education, using educational affirmative action to activate the poor, fostering inter-school competition, and controlling teachers' salaries and collective action during the nineties (Carnoy, 1999; Feldfeber and Saforcada, 2005) , a wide reaction against the Washington Consensus permeates most Latin American policy proposals nowadays (Saforcada and Vassiliade, 2011) . A certain desire to emulate the United Nations' philosophy on human rights, inclusive education and human development permeates the bulk of participative reforms and strategic plans in the continent (Puntigliano, 2007) .
This landscape includes a rhetorical emphasis on new kinds of regionalism, although discourses and practices are not always clearly matched (Malamud, 2009) 14 training and access to higher education, and committed all the schools, municipalities and states in the country to produce and closely monitor their own plan for the development of education (Arretche, 2010) São Paulo has its own system of evaluation that provides supplementary consultancy to vulnerable schools, and recognises the wider autonomy of the better institutions (OECD, 2010) . Some case studies also show that the success of the Federal funds is underpinned by opening local processes of citizen participation. The empirical accounts of municipal decentralisation observe a long-term struggle to underpin local strategic planning against top-down decisions, highlighting a major opening of policy networks in municipalities governed by left-wing governments (Sarmiento, 2005) . Besides this commitment to school improvement, in a variety of municipalities local participation also seems to encourage a stronger fiscal control of potential corruption or irresponsible expenditure (Ramos and Giorgi, 2011) .
However, after the Federation implemented the PDE the governors of Minas Gerais and São
Paulo (and other states) decided to challenge the Federal regulation that established a minimum salary for teachers. For the last years, these states have made it compulsory for educational (municipal) employers to adopt performance-based systems that do not comply with the threshold.
The union has responded with marches, strikes and statements against this policy; and significantly, sometimes this position has been presented to governors in conferences convened by All for Education.
The Ibero-American 2021 Educational Goals and Brazil's PDE rely on very similar 'programme ontologies' sharing claims on inclusive education, synergies between education and productive economy, and participative evaluation. Thus, in the same way that the OEI 2021 Educational Goals want to strengthen an Ibero-American community of nations based on social justice and democracy (OEI, 2010: 16) , the PDE expects to ground an integrated national educational system on the right of everybody to education. Simultaneously, this principle demands not only the design of unitary stages, modalities and educational levels but also the articulation of these with territorial planning and social and economic development, since this is the only way to guarantee the right to learn to each and everyone to the best of their abilities" (Ministry of Education BR, 2008: 6).
Both of them suggest a tentative contribution to economic development that would compensate for long-term shortcomings and respond to new technological challenges. By the end of the current decade the final reports will be published and subject to open debate. At that moment the evaluation of OEI 2021 Educational Goals, which were already designed through open consultation, will rely on dialogue and discussion. In a similar vein, Brazil's PDE is being assessed by official data which are widely disseminated in order to promote civic involvement in educational issues. So far, interim reports are quite optimistic about advancement in terms of enrolment and performance in Brazil (INEP, 2012; OECD, 2010) ; eventually, the informational basis provided by standard examinations and demographic estimates of enrolment will serve as a base for the final judgements issued in 2021. ', teachers', local educational authorities' and politicians' commitment to learning [my italics] . Here, responsibility and mobilisation transforms schools into a public rather than a statecontrolled space. Dissemination is helpful to identify best practices -which can therefore be spread-, and shortcomings, which can therefore be tackled more effectively (Ministry of Education, BR, 2007: p. 20) .
"According to the accurate conclusions of LLECE (Latin American Laboratory for Educational Quality) studies, the challenge lies in building a system of evaluation drawing on 'dialogic methods' [my italics]
(UNESCO/ LLECE, 2008b) whereby conversation and opinion exchange is promoted. Therefore, evaluation does not only yield figures or data but the provided information becomes meaningful for the person and the institution receiving them" (OEI, 2008: pp. 123-4) ..
Thus, the on-going interaction between UNESCO and OEI, the Brazilian debate on the PDE in the municipal, state and national conferences, the particularities of state and municipal education Despite these different institutional designs, in both cases the symptoms of 'regulatory regionalism' (Jayasuriya, 2008) are visible in terms of power, pluri-scalar politics, knowledge and the management of time frames. Arguably, international, regional organisations acquire 'global political capabilities' (Sassen, 2006) when seeking legitimation. At the same time, some national and sub-national governments try to get the most out of these new developments. Finally, 'programme ontologies' endow these political actors with new instruments of power.
Firstly, international agencies ally in order to shape new regional 'education spaces'. In Europe, the EU relies on technical support provided by the OECD, which appears to be quite satisfied to widen its role as an international consultant in this way. In Latin America, an alliance is also visible between OEI and the Federal government of Brazil. Here, the former needs some national counterparts to support its great but open 2021 Educational Goals, whereas the latter presents itself as a regional leader in these experimental forms of open coordination.
Secondly, even though these two 'education spaces' become supra-national fields of social activity, their effects are quite visible at other scales of policy-making. In Europe, a sample of small countries and the governments of national minorities have adopted education plans analogous to the EU proposal in order to reinforce their own policy and their presence in the regional space. In Latin America, Brazil not only illustrates a national use of planning methods which are quite similar to international ones, but also shows new sorts of provincial and municipal appropriation.
Lastly, in the midst of these international alliances, national implications and sub-national innovations, the great educational plans provide their promoters with a new policy instrument. The noticeable power of the EU to delay the effective evaluation of the Lisbon Agenda, and the ability of Brazil to diversify the moments of evaluation (2015, 2021) instantiate a new 'political capability' engendered in the context of global transformations (Sassen, 2006) . By drawing on varied scales of decision, and blurring the boundaries between the national and the international, governments and international organisations manage to schedule the key moments of evaluation at their convenience.
The 'programme ontology' of their great educational plans helps them to integrate countries, define regions, and set the appropriate time for evaluation.
Conclusion
Through a comparative analysis of international educational plans in Europe and Latin America, this article argues that power and agency, international, national and sub-national fields of activity, and the political implication of the expert knowledge coded in 'programme ontologies' drive the processes whereby these plans are designed and implemented. Notably, both the EU 2020 Strategy and the OEI 2021 Educational Goals assume that their ambitious goals will eventually transform 20 primary, secondary and tertiary education, as well as lifelong learning, so that all these educational sub-sectors will produce a positive effect on the other ones, and the educational systems as a whole will establish new synergies with the economies of their countries.
This political analysis is relevant in order to understand the intricate impact of globalisation on education, and correspondingly, the very influence of education policies on current global transformations. Rather than actor-blind, inexorable processes, all these social changes are the ultimate outcome of human agency. Moreover, if human agency is at stake, cosmopolitan deliberative democracy also has an opportunity despite some undeniable difficulties.
Besides these scholarly contributions, however, the former political analysis also suggests a more concrete conclusion on policy evaluation. The analyses of political conflict and negotiation do not imply that 'programme ontologies' are essentially right or wrong, but simply unveil the social interests conveyed by this kind of scientific knowledge. We could only find out their validity, or their fallacies, if we eventually examined how the plans inspired by their tenets worked by comparing salient case studies inspired by these similar assumptions (Pawson, 2006) . Right now,
this is an open question.
Finally, the former comparative analysis suggests that the impact of these great strategic educational plans is not linear at all. In fact, whereas the Lisbon Agenda failed to yield the expected results in Europe (Pépin, 2011) , at least the Brazilian Plan for the Development of Education (PDE) is welcomed as a successful initiative by some official, national and international reports (INEP, 2012; OECD, 2010) . To date, the question about their last impact remains open too.
